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Abstract
In this thesis, we study different Internet pricing schemes and how they can be
applied to a multiple ISP environment. We first take a look at the current Internet
architecture. Then the different classes that make up the Internet hierarchy are
discussed. We also take a look at peering among Internet Service Providers (ISPs)
and when it is a good idea for an ISP to consider peering. Moreover, advantages
and disadvantages of peering are discussed along with speculations of the evolution
of the Internet peering ecosystem. We then consider different pricing schemes
that have been proposed and study the factors that make up a good pricing plan.
Finally, we apply some game theoretical concepts to discuss how different ISPs could
interact together. We choose a pricing model based on a Stackelberg game that
takes into consideration the effect of the traffic variation among different customers
in a multiple ISP environment. It allows customers to specify their desired QoS
in terms of maximum allowable end-to-end delay. Customers only pay for the
portion of traffic that meet this delay bound. Moreover, we show the effectiveness
of adopting this model through a comparison with a model that does not take traffic
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and Malhamé’s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
4.19 Comparing Customers’ Costs for Our Model and Malhamé’s . . . . 63
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Pricing the Internet has always been a hot topic. After all, what good is a network
if you can not make profit out of it! Internet pricing has taken many turns since
the early stages of the Internet itself. There are many arguments nowadays as to
whether the current pricing schemes are adequate or not.
After investigating and studying various pricing schemes for the Internet, it
turns out that coming up with a good pricing plan is a non-trivial task. Some
questions come to mind such as what does the Internet structure look like? What
factors should be taken into consideration when designing a good pricing scheme?
Once we placed a good and efficient pricing scheme, how does one use this model
in a multiple ISP environment such that all ISPs maximize their profit in a fair
manner?
Andrew Odlyzko in [12] argues that pricing the Internet follows the same pat-
tern of evolution as other communication technologies. He says that the history
of snail mail, telegraph, and telephones present a consistent pattern in their pric-
ing evolution. First quality rises which then leads to price decrease, then usage
starts to elevate, hence total profits increase, and finally pricing models become
much simpler. Odlyzko is in favor of the flat rate pricing scheme, because it meets
customers’ likings for being simple and predictable. Moreover, it stimulates and
encourages more usage.
On the other hand, Jörn Altmann and Karyen Chu in [1], argue that a problem
with flat-rate pricing is that it is very stressful for the network. The result would be
1
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an overall reduction in network performance. They continue to elaborate the fact
that users do not face the true marginal cost of their usage. Nevertheless, they also
state some disadvantage of other pricing schemes such as pure per-minute pricing
plans. In their paper [1], they acknowledge the fact that QoS should be included
in coming up with good pricing schemes, and they propose such a pricing scheme.
Furthermore, Burkhard Stiller et al in [17], state the same argument of the need for
pricing and charging for more than a single service class. They say that flat-rate
pricing should be revised and they propose another pricing scheme, which they call
the cumulus pricing scheme.
Peering between local ISPs is also a hot issue for several reasons. Transit costs
are reduced when peering, ISPs have more control over routing, path redundancy
occurs, and QoS is enhanced due to less latency. Although peering is becoming
more popular, it cannot be a substitute for transit services. We will discuss various
peering issues in this thesis and what challenges are faced by ISPs to establish
peering.
Much research has been conducted on how Internet Service Providers (ISPs)
interact in a multiple ISP domain. Researchers have often used Game Theoretical
principles to ensure fair dealings among these providers while maximizing their
profits at the same time. Many models have been suggested, some proposed that
ISPs be the sole players of the game, whereas others included customers as well.
Some models introduced different hierarchies for players, and others introduced the
leader-follower game. In this thesis we will take a look at some of these proposals,
choose one, and extend it to meet our needs.
The thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 investigates some background and
related work. It begins with basic definitions and terminology for the Internet peer-
ing ecosystem. It shows the hierarchy in the Internet and defines different classes
of players. Also, peering issues, such as deciding when to consider peering, and the
evolution of the peering ecosystem are discussed. Next we discuss what require-
ments should be taken into consideration when placing a pricing plan. Furthermore,
various pricing plans are presented along with a description of each and how these
pricing schemes compare with the requirements. We then discuss how to apply a
pricing scheme in a multiple ISP environment.
In Chapter 3, we introduce the formulation of our pricing model. Assumptions
are laid along with the game framework which consists of the players of the game
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and their utility functions. A detailed explanation of the formulation of the game
is also presented.
In Chapter 4, numerical results are given in the form of tables and figures. Four
scenarios of the game as different combinations of customers and ISPs are discussed.
At the end of this chapter, we develop a näıve scenario to see if things could be
done in an easier way. Furthermore, we show a comparison between our model and
a model developed by [14], and explain how our model is more suitable.
The thesis ends with Chapter 5 giving conclusions and some suggested future
work. Appendix A, gives a pseudocode for our program for the scenario of two ISPs
serving two customers. Finally, Appendix B presents a brief explanation of Nash
equilibrium used in our program.
Chapter 2
Background and Related Work
2.1 THE INTERNET PEERING ECOSYSTEM
The Internet is a diverse body consisting of millions of networks, which further
comprise many network devices such as routers, switches, servers, workstations, etc.
These networks are operated by a number of network operators, content providers,
and end users that are called “Internet Players” by [11].
2.1.1 Basic Definitions and Terminology
The Internet Peering Ecosystem is defined by [11] as a population of networks con-
nected by means of a protocol stack, which is provided by the Internet Engineering
Task Force. The network operators interact and interconnect in different business
affairs.
The Global Internet Peering Ecosystem consists of different Internet Regions.
An Internet Region is usually defined as a part of the Internet that is governed
by certain geographical boundaries. For an Internet Service Provider (ISP) to be
in contact with the rest of the Internet, it requires transit or peering relationships
within an Internet Region. Transit ISPs sell access to the rest of the Internet,
whereas peering is a connection between two ISPs in which they both provide
access to one another’s customers free of charge.
4
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Figure 2.1: Classes of Internet Players within an Internet Region.
In a Peering Ecosystem three classes of Internet players are defined: Tier 1 ISPs,
Tier 2 ISPs, and Content Providers/Enterprise Companies (shown in Figure 2.1).
These definitions are given in detail in the next few sections according to [11].
Tier 1 ISP
Tier 1 ISPs are considered to be at the top of the hierarchy of the Internet model.
These ISPs have access to the entire Internet Region through peering relationships;
hence they do not pay transit fees. All other ISPs located in this Internet Region
need to purchase transit from those Tier 1 ISPs in order to have a connection to
the Internet Region and to the outside world as well.
Tier 1 ISP peering is done only to provide accessibility to their customers,
because they do not pay transit fees. Figure 2.2, which was taken from [11], gives
an example of a Tier 1 region in the US.
Since some Internet Regions may become very large, therefore to distribute
peering load among multiple points, an Interconnect Region is introduced. Fig-
ure 2.3 shows an example of eight interconnection regions within one big Internet
Region, which is the entire United States.1
1Figure 2.3 was taken from [11].
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Figure 2.2: An example of a Tier 1 Interconnection Region in the US.
Figure 2.3: Tier 1 Interconnection Regions within an Internet Region (US).
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Tier 2 ISP
This type of ISPs buys transit from Tier 1 ISPs and then resells it to either other
Tier 2 ISPs or to Content Providers/Enterprise Companies or regular customers.
Tier 2 ISPs usually peer only in Interconnect Regions where they sell services,
which generate a diverse community of peering Tier 2 ISPs within each Interconnect
Region. As a result there is a vast number of peering policies and peering becomes
a local routing optimization problem for each Tier 2 ISP.
There is great cooperation between Tier 2 ISPs based on similar interests. They
all tend to buy transit and therefore are interested in peering relationships.
Tier 2 ISPs are often referred to as the “middle man”. They do not like anyone
to know that they buy transit, because of some competition with Tier 1 ISPs over
really big customers. Generally speaking, Tier 1 ISPs do not like to peer with Tier 2
ISPs, because they consider them as potential customers.
Tier 2 ISPs have many incentives to peer such as:
• Trim down Transit Costs
When ISPs choose to peer, provided that a large enough volume of traffic is
being exchanged, it is beneficial, because this reduces the transit costs. The
reason there is a requirement that a large volume of traffic is exchanged is
to compensate the initial setup costs of a private exchange between the two
ISPs. This will be discussed later in detail.
• Enhanced Quality of Service
Less delay occur when traffic flows directly between ISPs that are in a peering
relationship, rather than first sending the traffic to a transit provider that for-
wards it to the destination ISP. Moreover, probability of packet loss decreases
when peering.
• Tighter Routing Control
It has been noticed that some ISPs prefer to have some control over the route
that its traffic traverses. By peering this requirement is fulfilled.
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The Content Provider
Content Providers are those companies that run an Internet service but do not
sell transit. Practical examples of Content Providers are eBay, Amazon.com, and
Staples.com. Examples of Enterprises include Agilent, Hertz, Avon, and General
Electric.
Content Providers purchase transit to deliver their content to their online users.
They are very similar in their function to the Tier 2 ISPs in the Peering Ecosystem.
However, they do not sell transit, do not focus on operating a network, and do not
manage peering relationships. Furthermore, the ordinary user would also fall under
the content provider’s category.
In general there are no peering relationships among content providers. This is
due to the fact that they either compete with each other or they have no interest
in one another’s business.
2.1.2 Advantages and Disadvantages of Peering
Before we list some of the advantages and disadvantages of peering (mostly stated
by [10]) we would like to note that peering cannot be a replacement of transit by
any means. This is, because transit provides access to the entire Internet routing
table, while peering just provides access to each other’s customers [10].
Advantages of Peering
Some of these advantages have been discussed before but we include them here
again just for the sake of completion.
• Reducing Costs
This was discussed before and it is further elaborated in [10] by comparing
the transit costs and the peering ones with respect to the volume of traffic.
Figure 2.4 shows the tradeoff and the breakeven point. It is obvious that as
the amount of traffic increases both the transit and the peering costs decrease.
However, transit costs decrease slightly and in far away steps, whereas peering
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Figure 2.4: Transit Costs and Peering Costs vs. volume of traffic.
costs decrease exponentially, because ISPs are able to cover their initiation
setup costs for peering.
• Low Latency Path
The lowest delay path is provided between ISP customers. Peering improved
performance by as much as 40-50 milliseconds as mentioned in [10].
• More Control over Routing
More flexibility is given to ISPs to route around congested paths. This further
enhances the quality of service to the customers.
• Providing Redundancy
Transit services could serve as a backup plan in the case of a peering session
failure.
Disadvantages of Peering
• Lack of Expertise
Network expertise is needed for peering unlike just buying transit from a
higher Tier ISP.
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK 10
• Administrative Startup Costs
Peering needs a lot of negotiations between legal departments of two ISPs,
which becomes tedious.
• Not Always Granted
Some ISPs have unpublished peering conditions that allow only the largest
ISPs to peer with them.
• Slow Process
It may take several months to get a peering relationship up and going.
2.1.3 Evolution of the Peering Ecosystem
As a case study for the U.S. Internet Peering Ecosystem, the author of [11] has
found out that there are some dramatic changes that happened to the Peering
Ecosystem over the past few number of years. In this section we will take a brief
look at those changes and their causes.
The Economic Breakdown of the Telecom Sector in 1999/2000
As a result of that, many Tier 1 ISPs went bankrupt, which in turn caused Internet
players to make sure that their businesses and financial status is well. From that
time, the economics of peering has been a hot topic.
Used Networking Equipment Market Grows
After the bankruptcy of many companies discussed above, used networking compo-
nents became available and were much cheaper than their new counterparts. This
in turn led the existing ISPs at the time to reduce their capital cost of peering.
Peer-to-Peer File Sharing Networks Grow in Popularity
Peer-to-peer networks have shown a dramatic increase in popularity lately. This has
lead to enormous amount of traffic being exchanged among users of the Internet.
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Since users leave their PCs on 24/7 to download files such as music or videos, this
has become a heavy burden on their service providers. Therefore, ISPs had greater
incentives to adopt the peering mechanism since it is cheaper on their part.
As a side note, it was shown [11] that peer-to-peer traffic volume grows when
cable companies peer with each other. This is, because software such as Kazaa
tends to fetch files across the recently peered network route. Its protocol determines
which sharer is more local and automatically selects that sharer to download from.
A result of all of this, is that when cable companies start to peer, they should expect
a significant increase in their traffic volume. This could be seen from Figure 2.5
taken from the Toronto Internet Exchange (TorIX) usage statistics over a year2.
This figure shows how usage increases over time.
Figure 2.5: Toronto Internet Exchange (TorIX) aggregated switch traffic over a
period of a year.
2.2 PRICING SCHEMES
Pricing schemes for the Internet have taken so many forms since the birth of the
Internet itself. It turns out that coming up with a pricing plan is a non-trivial
task, because a lot of factors must be taken into consideration. The author of [13]
gives a nice presentation of the general requirements for a good pricing plan. These
requirements include three major groups, which are shown in Figure 2.6. Balancing
of these requirements determine the quality and suitability of Internet pricing.
We briefly discuss these requirements below.
2This figure was taken from http://www.torix.net/peers.php
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Figure 2.6: General Requirements for a good pricing scheme.
• Customer: A preference for customers is a major role in determining a pric-
ing scheme. Transparency and predictability play an important role towards
the customers’ likings.
• Economic: An ISP’s goal is to run a network in the most efficient manner. It
does so by maximizing its network utility function or the total revenue. This
in turn plays an important role in placing prices, because it might indicate the
status of the network in terms of congestion. For instance suppose a customer
is misbehaving by overusing the network resources, then the ISP may punish
this user by raising the prices.
• Technical: Accounting and the way an ISP collects data about the cus-
tomers’ usage is a major factor in pricing. This is a very complex problem
due to the huge amount of packets traveling through the network. Several
proposals have been submitted to reduce this complexity by carefully choosing
parameters, classes, and accounting locations.
In the following sections we will take a look at some of the current proposed
pricing schemes and see how they conform to the above-mentioned requirements.
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2.2.1 Flat-Rate Pricing
Customers are charged a flat rate for unlimited access to the Internet per month.
This pricing scheme is most common in North America. This pricing plan applies to
both dial-up access service and broadband service. A typical flat rate fee would be
around US $20.00 per month for dial-up access and US $10.00-200.00 for broadband
access [1]. QoS for broadband access differs by the initial contract between the
ISP and the customer, which typically depends on the connection speed (access
bandwidth). Users cannot switch to higher connection speeds on demand; they
must purchase a higher bandwidth from the ISP, which is again a flat rate.
It has been shown by the INternet Demand Experiment (INDEX)3 that users
prefer flat-rate pricing plans the best. This is, because users already know what
their bill will be at the end of the month (pricing stability). Furthermore, they
can leave their PCs on 24/7 downloading all sorts of files. On the other hand flat-
rate pricing plans are inefficient economically, because users do not face the true
marginal cost of usage which leads to over-usage of the network resources. As a
result there is a potential of reduction of overall performance of the network due to
congestion.
To conclude this discussion, flat-rate pricing satisfies the customer and technical
requirement, because it is acceptable to the customer and at the same time easy to
monitor by the ISP. However, it does not satisfy the economic requirement due to
its inefficiency in handling network resources.
2.2.2 Usage-Based Pricing
There are two main charging schemes within the usage-based pricing. The most
common one is the minute-based pricing plan. Customers are charged on a per
minute basis. This is most common in Europe where customers have free usage of
some minutes, but if they exceed it they are charged per minute. Typical rates vary
between 1 and 4 cents within Europe, independent of whether the access technology
is telephone or DSL [1]. There is also another type of usage-based pricing which
is byte-based. In this scheme the user is charged according to how many bytes of
data he/she has downloaded or uploaded.
3We give a detailed explanation of INDEX in a subsequent section.
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Usage-based pricing encourages users to disconnect from the network when they
are not using the service which helps improve the service on the networks side.
However, this is inconvenient to the customers for two reasons. First, they can not
predict their bill at the end of the month (pricing instability). Second, they are not
motivated to spend more time on the Internet, which limits revenues from other
sources such as advertisements and retailing. Furthermore, it limits the evolution
of the Internet to be a multi-service/multi-purpose network [1].
2.2.3 Diff-Serv Pricing
Regular Diff-Serv
Traffic is classified according to required QoS. The better QoS a customer requires
the more he/she has to pay. Such discrimination in prices maximizes the ISP’s
profit. This kind of pricing is common in other industries such as airplane travel
where the price of tickets differ [7].
This type of pricing could be somewhat acceptable to customers, because you
pay for exactly what you want. As for the ISP’s side it is also beneficial, because
not only is the network better off in terms of congestion, but also the ISP’s profit is
maximized. As for the technical requirement it becomes very complex to monitor
the packets of each user.
A Variation of Diff-Serv
A variation of the well-known Diff-Serv pricing scheme has been proposed in [1]
and we give a brief explanation of it in this section. The basic idea proposed is to
combine both flat-rate pricing plans with usage-based pricing plans in a Diff-Serv
manner. To elaborate, users would have unlimited access to the Internet with an
initial bandwidth agreed upon in the contract. However, the users can also access
higher bandwidths on demand in which they are charged according to a usage-based
scheme. This proposal is based on the famous INDEX experiment which took place
at the University of California (Berkeley). This experiment was aimed at analyzing
user demand for the Internet as a function of QoS, budget, various pricing schemes,
and application. The different experiments are:
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• Minute Pricing Experiments
Subjects are charged on a per minute basis for connecting to the Internet at
each of five different bandwidths which are 16, 32, 64, and 128 kbps. All
subjects have free of charge unlimited access to the Internet at an 8 kbps
bandwidth. Subjects have the option of selecting any of the bandwidths at
any time. This experiment runs for seven weeks with variation in prices
throughout, except that the first week is free of charge to give the subjects
an idea of their usage.
• Byte Pricing Experiment
Subjects still have the 8 kbps bandwidth for free and unlimited access and a
128 kbps bandwidth that is charged according to the number of bytes trans-
mitted. The experiment again runs for seven weeks with per-byte prices
changing every week.
• Minute-Byte Pricing Experiment
Pricing plan is based on different combinations of both minute based and byte
based plans. Subject are given the option of selecting a pure per minute plan,
a pure per byte plan, or a combination of the two. Subjects also have the
option of choosing from six different bandwidths within each pricing plan.
• Flat-Rate Buy-Out Option Experiment
This experiment is similar to the minute pricing experiment; however, cus-
tomers have the option of buying out a certain bandwidth with its corre-
sponding price. If the subject were to choose to buy-out a certain bandwidth
then this bandwidth could not be changed for the rest of the week. The high-
est bandwidth’s price is chosen randomly and then the prices of the lower
bandwidths are taken to be a fraction of the highest one.
In this portion of our discussion we just give the final results of the INDEX
project for more details of the experiment please refer to [1]. In Figure 2.7, Altmann
and Chu show the average bytes transmitted per user per day for the different
experiments, which are from left to right, the free trial weeks, two minute based
experiments, the byte based experiment, the minute-byte based experiment, and
the flat-rate buy-out experiment. As it is obvious from Figure 2.7 that when the
flat-rate buy-out option was available the usage increased significantly to almost
reach that of the free weeks’ trial!
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Figure 2.7: Transmitted bytes per user per day vs. different pricing schemes.
More results of INDEX have shown that subjects have spent more money per
week during the flat-rate buy-out phase than in the other experiments. Moreover,
the results show that subjects prefer the option of having higher non bought-out
bandwidths at their demand whenever they need them. Putting all these results
together enabled the author of [1] to come up with the proposal previously ex-
plained. Some concluding remarks about this proposal are found in the next three
paragraphs.
From the customers’ perspective, the flat-rate buy-out option is considered a
very good pricing scheme, because not only do they have unlimited access to the
Internet, but they also have access to higher bandwidths any time they need it.
So it combines the benefits of the flat-rate pricing plans (stability of prices) and
flexibility of acquiring different QoS for access on demand.
From the ISPs’ prospective, this plan provides additional revenues besides the
ones they would get from purely flat-rate plans. This was the main advantage
of the regular Diff-Serv plan. Furthermore, this pricing plan reduces over-usage of
resources due to the user-based component, which fulfills the economic requirement.
Finally, in terms of the accounting technology, it will definitely be more diffi-
cult than pure flat-rate pricing. However, it would probably be less or of equal
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complexity to the Diff-Serv pricing scheme.
2.2.4 Congestion Pricing
The basic idea behind this scheme is to have customers pay for the congestion they
make by sharing in the social costs. Different approaches have been proposed and
we include some in this section that have been described in [7].
Smart Market
This is a kind of auction scheme. At each congested node a bid value for each
incoming packet indicates the amount that the owner of this packet is willing to
pay to have his packet go through the node. Then the node (router) holds an auction
and admits the packets with the highest bids. For more information on this scheme
refer to [9]. This type of pricing scheme is considered very efficient economically,
but can yield unstable charges along with complex technical accounting difficulties
[13].
Vickrey Auction
This scheme is very similar to the smart market; however, the winner pays the
second highest bid instead of the highest one. Since bidders are no longer afraid
of making high bids, therefore their true preferences appear. Although this scheme
may prevent congestion effectively, but it was determined that it can not work in
a large network. In a large network with multiple congested routers, a packet that
wins at a given router might lose at the next, because the bid value at the first
router is subtracted from the total bid value. If a user wishes to program the packet
to give a new bid at each router then a feedback signal to the user must occur to
provide information about the current status of the packet. Unfortunately this is
not feasible, because this feedback signal will congest the network even more! For
more information about this scheme refer to [18] and [8].
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Edge Mechanism
The idea here is to shift the pricing decisions to the edge of the network. This allows
operators to charge for expected congestion instead of the actual one. A scheme
called the split-edge pricing framework [2] argues that instead of users making
individual payments to owners of congested routers, pricing is applied only to users
at the network’s end. Each ISP finds out the cost of traffic through its own network
and offers various service categories to its neighbors at a certain price. This pricing
scheme is very good for its simplicity and transparency to the user [13].
Statistical Approaches
Routers mark packets in case of congestion using two bits in the IP header which are
known as the Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) mechanism. An ISP can make
use of this by aggregating the ECN mark and at the receiver the number of marks
can be counted then a charge would be applied. This scheme might be difficult
to implement, because various networks use the ECN field for different purposes
which invokes a compatibility problem. Furthermore, some security concerns may
arise if a rogue router tampers with these two bits. We would like to note that this
scheme is somewhat similar to the cumulus pricing that is discussed in the next
section.
To conclude this section of congestion prices one has to take the customers’
opinion to this scheme into consideration. As stated before, users generally prefer
stable QoS levels at predictable prices. Moreover, many congestion pricing schemes
assume small numbers of congested nodes. Although this assumption maybe valid
for predictable networks such as road networks, it cannot be easily applied to the
Internet which has highly unpredictable congestion scenarios.
2.2.5 Cumulus Pricing
It is a flat-rate pricing scheme in principle where rates vary over long periods of
time. The author of [13] proposes this scheme that is based on cumulus points
that serve as a feedback mechanism. First, an initial agreement is set between the
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ISP and the customer. This agreement includes certain QoS requirements by the
user such as expected bandwidth, delay, probability of packet loss, etc. Next, the
ISP monitors the user’s usage and after each month the user either cumulates red
points for exceeding the agreed upon bandwidth or cumulates green points for the
opposite case. The more the difference between the actual usage and the agreed
upon bandwidth the more cumulative points are given. A decision is taken after
some specified number of billing periods (a billing period = 1 month) which could
be after one year for example or if the number of points exceed a certain maximum
(threshold). At the end of the year the cumulative points are added for the user in
which a green point cancels a red one. If the user has green points he/she may get
a refund or cumulate these points for the next year. If the user has red points a
decision may be to pay an equivalent amount of money to the number of red points
and perhaps increase the bandwidth requirement for the next year. Figure 2.8,
which was reproduced from [13], gives a nice illustration of a typical user who
agreed on a bandwidth of x and receives points according to the actual usage till
a threshold is reached in the month of June when a decision should be made. It is
observed that a green point cancels a red one from the month of March. A formal
model for this scheme is described in [13].
Figure 2.8: Illustration of the Cumulus Pricing Scheme.
Final Remarks: When comparing the cumulus pricing scheme to our require-
ment types defined earlier, we find that this scheme does a good job. First, it is a
flat-rate scheme, so it has all the benefits of this scheme in terms of the acceptance
by the majority of customers (price stability).
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Second, it gives variability in the QoS, which again according to the INDEX
experiment is highly preferred by users. Third, it is transparent to the customer and
provides feedback every billing period (a month) and does not annoy the customer,
because the decision is made after a long period of time when the decision threshold
is met.
Fourth, it is an implementation of the edge pricing scheme, because the only
interaction for the customer is with the ISP in negotiating the contract and receiving
cumulus points.
Fifth, it is economically efficient, because accumulated points at the end of a
period are either rewarded for under-use or penalized for over-use. This in some
sense should keep the network in a non-congested state.
Sixth, it is technically feasible, because after all, it is up to the ISP to specify
the way it wants to monitor the users’ usage. Therefore, a simple method of taking
rough measurements or perhaps even estimations of user’s activity would fulfill the
accounting technical feasibility issue.
Finally, it would be a good idea to research some of the metering policies and
their complexities. Also, more focus should be on how to prevent fraudulent users
who try to cheat the scheme. Furthermore, studying the different trade-offs of
design issues for ISPs should be given more attention.
2.3 PRICING IN A MULTIPLE ISP DOMAIN
So far we have discussed the basic building blocks of the Internet and we have seen
the concept of peering and of purchasing transit. We also talked about different
pricing schemes that are being applied currently or under research. It is now time
to bring all these issues together and study how ISPs interact with one another in
the real world and how they place their prices to attract customers in a competitive
market.
This research topic is becoming more popular these days, because of current
demands for change of the Internet itself. As discussed in the literature nowadays,
communication networks are trying to converge to one big network by combining
the wireless cellular communication world with the IP world. This has been a
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dream for 3G networks, but now this dream has been postponed till when 4G is
deployed.
Whether this is all feasible in the near future or not, researchers have already
started researching how billing can be performed in a multiple ISP environment. In
this section we would like to take a brief look at four papers discussing how Game
Theory can be used to provide means for implementing pricing models in such an
environment where ISPs compete for customers.
The first paper is by Shakkottai and Srikant [15]. In this paper the authors
place a pricing model for the Internet consisting of a hierarchy of ISPs, such as
Tier 1, Tier 2 and Local ISPs, along with the possibility of peering through Private
Exchange Modules. Some game theoretical concepts are first discussed. Then based
on the Internet model placed; they study how different local ISPs interact at the
same level in the hierarchy and between different levels in the hierarchy. Then they
take a look at the case when there are private exchange modules. After that, QoS
is considered along with other pricing schemes in the model. In all of the discussion
of this paper a threat strategy is placed based on Nash reversion to ensure the
cooperation of different ISPs. The authors prove that if a large number of ISPs are
present, this will lead to price wars. Eventually some ISPs would buy out others
until we have a smaller number of players to ensure that a threat strategy is in
place. For more details on this research, we refer the reader to [15].
We then look at [3]. The authors of this paper study two types of games. The
first one is with an ISP as a player and a customer as the other player of the game.
They show that a leader-follower game in this case may lead to a non Pareto optimal
solution which may also be unfair. They argue that by cooperation, and with the
help of some kind of government regulations to sustain it, both players would be
better off than with the leader-follower game. The second game is between two ISPs
competing for customers, which is a nonzero sum game. They show by numerical
methods that in this game a Nash equilibrium exists and that this proposal is
applicable to other pricing problems such as the Paris Metro pricing. For more
information on this paper please refer to [3].
In [6], the authors propose a fair revenue-sharing scheme based on weighted
proportional fairness. They argue that this scheme leads to higher profit for all
providers while encouraging improvements and upgrades for bottleneck links. More-
over, they point out that noncooperative pricing strategy leads to unfair distribution
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of profit among providers. It is to be noted that in this paper the price of a route
controls the number of customers using this route, which is modeled by a demand
function. Therefore, ISPs dynamically adjust their prices to control traffic demands
on the links of their network. Please refer to [6] for more details.
The fourth and final paper to be discussed in this section is by R. Malhamé et
al [14]. We would like to note that our pricing model, which is given in the next
chapter, is based on the model implemented in [14]. For this reason, we briefly go
through this paper indicating the differences between the two models, whereas in
the next chapter we give an in depth proposal of our model.
One of the motivations for [14] is that the profit of ISPs, which are the major
players of the Internet, has been neglected in many pricing schemes. Therefore,
the pricing scheme tries to maximize the profit of ISPs while maintaining a level of
quality of service for the customers. The structure proposed is of a third party (TP)
provider that oversees the ISPs. So the function of the TP is to negotiate a unit
flow price with a customer and to choose ISPs along the path of the customer’s
traffic from the source to the destination. Since the TP knows the structure of
the Internet, therefore it asks those ISPs that can deliver the customer’s traffic to
provide a certain delay guarantee (statistically not deterministic) specified by the
customer. It is agreed that a customer pays only for the percentage of traffic that
meets the agreed upon maximum tolerable delay. The TP takes a fixed percentage
of the profit and distributes the remaining portion to the ISPs according to a sharing
system that reflects the QoS they proposed to offer.
Some of the assumptions made by [14] are as follows: First, the game between
ISPs is a noncooperative game. Second, QoS is statistical and not guaranteed, be-
cause deterministic QoS is wasteful in bandwidth requirement and it becomes too
complicated in a multiple ISP environment. Third, this is a Stackelberg game in
which the TP is considered the leader and the ISPs form the group of followers.
Fourth, a perfect information game is assumed in which all the players know every-
thing about each other’s strategies. Fifth, only one data flow passes through the
ISPs, i.e. only one customer is allowed to send a single class of packets from the
source to the destination. Sixth, fixed routing is assumed from the source to the
destination. Finally, each ISP is represented by a single bottleneck node along the
route from source to destination in which an M/M/1 queue represents this node.
In our model, we took the same basic framework of the game and made some
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extensions to the model. First, we added more than one customer to the game,
hence we have different traffic classes with varying packet lengths. Second, as a
result of varying packet lengths, each ISP is now represented by an M/G/1 queue
instead of an M/M/1 queue. Finally, since we are dealing with a more general
scenario, we can no longer use probabilities to measure the portion of traffic that
meets the specified delay criterion by the customers. Instead we use the Pollaczek-
Khinchine formula to give average delays in which we compare with the maximum
delay tolerated by the customer. As a result of all this, the utility functions of the
TP and ISPs have been altered. Furthermore, the cost paid by a customer is not
only a function of the rate of traffic λ but also a function of the maximum tolerable
delay of that customer along with the coefficient of variation of its traffic.
To conclude this section, we would like to point out the reason behind choosing
[14] as a base for our work. This pricing scheme meets the three criteria discussed
before in Section 2.2 which are customer’s preference, economic efficiency for the
ISP’s network, and simple accounting and billing technique. This pricing scheme
meets the customer’s expectations of paying the same predictable amount of money
over the billing period while maintaining a fixed QoS. On the other hand, the net-
work only allows the amount of traffic that it can handle efficiently (by maximizing
its profit) before the agreement is signed between the customer and the TP. More-
over, billing is not a big issue due to the fact that QoS is monitored statistically and
not in a deterministic fashion. Therefore, this pricing scheme serves the purpose




So far in our discussion of Internet pricing models in a realistic environment of
multiple ISP domains, we have reached a point where we chose a model [14] that
suits our needs. In this chapter we introduce our expansion and variation of this
model to include more than one customer with traffic that is varying in packet
length. To do so, there was a need to re-define the utility functions of the players
along with adding some variables and slightly changing the way the game is played.
In Figure 3.1 we present a diagram of how the game is setup. In this game
we have two customers, C1 and C2, the third party (TP), and two Internet service
providers, ISP1 and ISP2 . This figure aims to show the relationship between these
different players of the game. Dashed lines represent control flow, whereas solid
lines represent data flow.
The two customers are requesting their traffic to flow from point A to point B.
They specify the maximum amount of tolerable delay they require. This request is
forwarded to the TP. Then the TP takes action by contacting different ISPs along
the path asking them to grant access to its customers. Each ISP responds to the
TP with the initial amount of bandwidth they are willing to offer the customers.
Each ISP has the option of adding extra bandwidth at additional cost on the ISP’s
part, provided that this would maximize its payoff. The TP then performs all
the optimization calculations, which will be discussed later, and agrees with the
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customers on a certain rate of traffic for each one of them along with the unit
flow price. This unit flow price is a function of the maximum tolerable delay,
coefficient of variation of traffic, and the rate of traffic. After attaining a portion
of the profit, the TP distributes the rest of the profit among the ISPs according to
a sharing mechanism which takes their contributions into consideration. After all
these negotiations are accomplished, traffic starts to flow from point A to point B.
It is in the customers’ best interest to maintain traffic rates at the same negotiated
rate, this can be done by sending dummy traffic.
To give a numeric example, we use the values of the scenario that will be men-
tioned in Section 4.2.1. Taking a look at Figure 3.1, the example proceeds as follows.
First, customer 1 and customer 2 notify the TP that their desired maximum delays
are 3 msec and 4 msec, respectively. They also, specify that they want their traffic
to move from point A to point B. Second, TP does some measurements for the
traffic coming from the two customers and negotiates with them the unit flow price
of traffic. It turns out that customer 1’s traffic has packets that are exponential in
nature, whereas customer 2’s traffic has deterministic packet lengths. The unit flow
price agreed upon is of the form exp(− λj
0.75
), where λj is the rate of traffic arrival
from customer j (j = 1, 2). Third, the TP passes on all the previously mentioned
values to ISP1 and ISP2 , which lie on the path from the source to the destination.
Fourth, both ISPs reply back to the TP with the initial amount of fixed bandwidth
(µ1 = 1.1 packets/msec and µ2 = 1.2 packets/msec) that they are willing to offer
along with a value for the maximum extra bandwidth (∆µ1 = 1 packet/msec and
∆µ2 = 1 packet/msec) that they can add. There is a price that an ISP pays for
each unit of added bandwidth. This value is denoted by p1 = 0.075 and p2 = 0.055.
Now that all the information is available, a non-cooperative game is played by the
ISPs for each possible value of λj’s. Since the TP is the leader of this game, it will
choose the value of λj to maximize its profit. Once λj’s are determined, the decision
variables of the ISPs are also found along with their associated profits. Finally, the
costs for customer 1 and 2 are calculated. For the numerical results, please refer to
Table 4.2.
The structure of this chapter is arranged as follows, in Section 3.2 we give
detailed information about the assumptions made in the model. In Section 3.3, we
go through a number of definitions for the framework of the game followed by a
description of the utility functions of the players of the game. Finally, in Section 3.4
a series of steps are presented to highlight the procedure by which the game flows.
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Figure 3.1: The Relationship between the Players of the Game
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3.2 ASSUMPTIONS
In this section we present the assumptions made related to our model. First, we
do not take routing into consideration. We just place the fact that customers need
their traffic to get from the source to destination. The TP is assumed to know the
structure of the Internet and the different autonomous systems with each region
belonging to which ISP. Hence, it is the TP’s responsibility to contact different
ISPs and find out which ones are willing to deliver the customers’ traffic from the
source to the destination. On the macro-level, the TP deals with routing between
ISPs, whereas on the micro-level, each ISP deals with its own routing issues.
Second, the design of the model enables customers to pay only for the percentage
of traffic that is actually delivered from source to destination with the agreed upon
QoS. In this case the QoS is the maximum tolerable delay for the customer’s traffic.
The model takes this into account using a decision variable in the utility function
of the TP and the ISPs. This decision variable is set to zero if the maximum
tolerable delay criterion is not met, whereas it is set to one if the criterion is met.
Furthermore, we would like to point out that in our model a customer is really a
group or a class of customers. In other words, they are not just a single user.
Third, as mentioned before, QoS is statistical not deterministic (guaranteed).
This saves on wasted bandwidth resources along with giving a rather easier pricing
scheme in terms of monitoring for billing purposes. Moreover, if deterministic QoS
had been used, it would have been much more challenging in determining end-to-
end delays within a multiple ISP domain.
Fourth, the system is decentralized by using a control scheme over QoS that is
enforced by the share of the total profit each ISP gets.
Fifth, each ISP is represented by a single bottleneck node along the route from
the source to the destination. An M/G/1 queue is used to model this node.
Sixth, a perfect information game is assumed. Every player knows the extra
bandwidth unit buying cost by each ISP, the original bandwidth offered by each
ISP, and the unit cost versus traffic relationship between the customer and the TP.
Furthermore, ISPs are transparent to the customers.
Finally, a Stackelberg game is introduced in which the TP is the leader and
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ISPs form the group of followers. Moreover, the game played between the ISPs
(followers) is a non-cooperative game.
3.3 GAME STRUCTURE
3.3.1 Definitions
Let λj ≡ rate of arrival of packets from customer j
Let Lj ≡ packet length of customer j
Let E[Lj] ≡ mean packet length of customer j
Let µi + ∆µi ≡ service rate of ISPi where ∆µi is the amount of extra bandwidth
that ISPi can increase to improve its overall payoff.

















The mean service time for all packets within ISPi is given by the sum of the mean
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The utilization factor for ISPi is given by:
ρi = λEi[σ] (3.6)
The total time spent in ISPi on average is given by the Pollaczek-Khinchine formula
below:











where n ≡ number of ISPs
The price paid by customer j depends on three factors. First, it is inversely pro-
portional to the maximum tolerable delay specified by customer j and denoted by
Tmaxj . Second, it is linearly proportional to the unit flow price, which is usually
taken to be an exponentially decreasing function of λj, and it is denoted by Cv(λj).
Finally, the price paid by customer j is linearly proportional to the coefficient of
variation of the traffic of customer j. The formula for customer j’s price is given
by:
PCj =
aCv(λj)λj (1 + β cj)
Tmaxj
(3.9)
where a is a decision variable that allows customer j to pay only for the amount of
traffic that meets the QoS agreed upon. It can have only two values, 1 and 0. It
takes a value of 1 if the total average time spent in the system by a packet is less
than the minimum of the maximum tolerable delays specified by each customer. It
takes the value of 0 otherwise. The variable a is given by:
a =
{
1 if E[T ] 6 min (Tmax1 ,Tmax2 , ...,Tmaxm ); m ≡ number of customers
0 otherwise
(3.10)
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In Equation (3.9), β is a factor to adjust the priority level for accepting different
traffic variations from users. Moreover, cj is the coefficient of variation of customer
j’s traffic and it is defined as the ratio between the standard deviation and the








The utility function of the TP is simply defined as the summation of the prices of
all the customers multiplied by a percentage factor of the total profit reserved for











where M ∈ [0, 1] which is the fraction of total profit reserved for the TP
It is to be noted that λ is the only decision variable for the TP, it is chosen to
maximize TPU .
Internet Service Providers (ISPs)
As mentioned before in the introduction of this chapter, each ISPi has a certain
amount of fixed bandwidth µi always available for all of the customers’ traffic. To
guarantee stability of the system the following condition must hold:∑
j
λmaxj 6 µi ∀i (3.13)
Moreover, each ISPi has the option to increase its bandwidth by ∆µi subject
to the condition ∆µi 6 ∆µmaxi ; therefore the actual bandwidth of ISPi is given by
µi + ∆µi at the price of pi per unit of bandwidth added.
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We next define the sharing mechanism by which each ISP is rewarded accord-
ing to its contribution towards QoS. ISPi ’s share is proportional to the difference
between the minimum of the maximum tolerable delays specified by each customer
and the average amount of time a packet spends in ISPi ’s network. ISPi ’s share is
given by:
Si =
min(Tmax1 ,Tmax2 , ...,Tmaxm )− Ei[T ]
min(Tmax1 ,Tmax2 , ...,Tmaxm )
(3.14)
From Equation (3.14) we notice that as Ei[T ] increases Si decreases so as to
penalize the ISP that offers poor QoS and reward those offering better QoS.
The utility function of ISPi is simply defined as the remaining portion of the
total profit, after the TP took its share, multiplied by ISPi ’s share (Si) multiplied
by the total price paid by all the customers. Then we subtract the cost of adding




PCj − pi ∆µi (3.15)
where a is given by Equation (3.10) and pi is the unit flow price for each unit of
added bandwidth.
It is to be noted that ∆µi is the decision strategy for ISPi .
3.4 FORMULATION OF THE STACKELBERG
GAME
The game takes the form of a Stackelberg game. A Stackelberg game is a game
which has a leader and some followers. The game is solved by backward induction.
The leader considers what the best response of the followers is, then the leader
picks a strategy for its decision variable that maximizes its own profit. The followers
actually observe this and in equilibrium choose the expected quantity as a response.
Of course in this game the leader has the upper hand and is in a better position.
In our model the leader is the TP whereas the ISPs are the followers of the game.
As we mentioned before in our assumptions in Section 3.2, the game is a perfect
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information game. This implies that all strategies are transparent and available to
all the players of the game.
The game is played as follows:
1. Each customer j notifies the TP with its desired Tmaxj along with the source
and destination points for its packets.
2. The TP measures the coefficient of variation of the traffic of each customer.
3. The TP negotiates with the customers the unit flow price of traffic Cv(λj).
4. The TP looks up in its database for the ISPs that it can approach, which
lie along the path from the source to the destination. It then passes the
information it gained from the customers to the ISPs and waits for a response
whether they are willing to be involved in the deal or not.
5. If an ISP replies with an approval, it will notify the TP with the initial amount
of fixed bandwidth µi and the maximum extra bandwidth ∆µmaxi it might
add.
6. For all possible λj’s, the calculations of Section 3.3.1 are performed, then
a non-cooperative game is played between all the ISPs to determine a Nash
equilibrium between them. In this game each ISPi chooses a decision strategy
∆µi of which would give it a better payoff.
7. Now the TP has the values of the utility functions of all ISPs under any choice
of λj’s, working its way backwards, it will choose values of λj’s that maximize
its own payoff. Hence its payoff is now calculated.
8. Now that the customer traffic level is determined, the payoffs of the ISPs are
automatically determined as well.
9. Finally, the customer’s price is calculated.
The outcome of the whole game is the traffic rate of each customer λj, the profit
of each ISP, the profit of the TP, and the price paid by each customer.
We would like to refer the reader to appendix A for a pseudocode example
involving two customers and two ISPs. Moreover, a brief explanation of the method
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used to calculate the Nash equilibrium among the followers of the game is found in
appendix B.
In this chapter we completely defined our model. We started off with some of
the assumptions made, followed by the framework of the game and the definitions
of the different utility functions of the players of the game. We then showed the
steps of playing the game to achieve our desired outcome. In our next chapter
we give simulation results that backup the theory presented in this chapter. It is
interesting to see that changing some of the initial parameters have a significant




In this chapter we present the numerical results for the simulation of our model that
was formulated in Chapter 3. We simulated four combinations of scenarios. The
first one is having two customers and two ISPs. The second is with two customers
and three ISPs. The third one is for three customers and two ISPs. Finally, the
last scenario is for three customers and three ISPs. Once more we note that the
customers here are really a group of customer not individual users.
In each of these scenarios we present a number of plots and tables. We are
interested in finding the Nash equilibrium for each case and hence the outcome of
the game. The results that identify the Nash equilibrium of the game are the values
of the extra added unit bandwidth ∆µ’s for the ISPs. The outcome of the game
are the values of the rate of arrival of the customers’ traffic λ’s, the profit of each
ISP, the profit of the TP, and the price paid by each customer.
Furthermore, for the scenarios having two customers we are able to have three
dimensional plots representing all possible values for the different outcomes of the
game versus the λ1 on the x-axis and λ2 on the y-axis.
In each scenario, the simulation is run twice. Once for a general case of having
different allowable maximum delay Tmax’s for customers along with having variation
in their traffic that is taken from different distributions. For the second case,
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we assume that all the customers have the same allowable maximum delay Tmax,
whereas the traffic variation in their traffic is still taken from different distributions.
The goal of this second case is to capture the effect of traffic variations without the
interference of Tmax.
4.2 SCENARIO 1: TWO CUSTOMERS AND
TWO ISPs
In this section we simulate the case of having the TP choose two ISPs along the
path from source to destination for two different customers. As indicated in the
introduction of this chapter, we will study two cases of simulation. The first case
we call it the General Case in which the Tmax’s of customers and their traffic
variations are arbitrarily chosen to differ between the customers. The second case
we call it the Fixed Tmax Case in which Tmax is the same for both customers and the
simulation is run multiple times for different values of Tmax. Again as mentioned
in the introduction, the reason for having the second case is to study the effect of
traffic variation alone without having Tmax in the equation.
4.2.1 General Case
In this case we assumed that the first customer has exponential packet lengths,
whereas the second one has deterministic packet lengths. Moreover, all the values
taken for the different variables in the simulation are shown in Table 4.1. We would
also like to note that some of the initial values used for these values were taken
from [14].
The results of the simulation are shown in Table 4.2. These results represent
the Nash equilibrium of the game. It is apparent from these results that ISP2 ’s
profit is greater than that of ISP1 . This is fair since ISP2 ’s contribution of band-
width is larger and hence it results in less delay for the overall system (Notice how
E2[T ]Nash < E1[T ]Nash). Furthermore, since customer 1’s traffic has more variations
in it than the traffic of customer 2, therefore it consumes more network resources.
For that reason and also, because Tmax1 < Tmax2 , we see that the price paid by
customer 1 is higher than that of customer 2 (Notice that PC1 > PC2). However,
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the pricing model admits more of customer 1’s traffic. This is, because in doing so,
it gives better profit for the TP and for the ISPs. We will see later on, when we
fix Tmax, there is a point where admitting more of customer 1’s traffic gives worse
results for the TP and the ISPs.







E1[T ]Nash 1.2612 [msec]






We also include a series of plots showing the outcome of the game. These plots
are plotted against λ1 and λ2 and are shown in Figures 4.1, 4.3, and 4.2. It is
apparent from these figures that they all tend to have a sharp fall at a certain value
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of λ1 and λ2. This is, because when increasing the rate of arrival of traffic to a
certain point, QoS deteriorates and hence the utility functions of the TP, and the
ISPs drop.
(a) ∆µ1 vs. λ1 and λ2
(b) ∆µ2 vs. λ1 and λ2
Figure 4.1: Additional Bandwidth Acquired by ISP1 and ISP2 as the Outcome of
the two Customers and two ISPs Game.
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(a) ISP1 vs. λ1 and λ2
(b) ISP2 vs. λ1 and λ2
Figure 4.2: The Utility of ISP1 and ISP2 as the Outcome of the two Customers
and two ISPs Game.
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Figure 4.3: The Utility of the TP as the Outcome of the two Customers and two
ISPs Game.
4.2.2 Fixed Tmax Case
In this section we deliberately make Tmax1 = Tmax2 = Tmax so that the system
chooses λ1 and λ2 based on the variation in the customers’ traffic only. The initial
conditions are the same as those given in Table 4.1. Once again the second customer
has deterministic packet lengths, however, we try different variations for the first
customer. We try first exponential packet lengths, then higher than exponential,
and finally much higher than exponential. In each case we plot λ1 and λ2 vs. Tmax,
the utilities of the TP and the ISPs vs. Tmax, and finally the price paid by each
customer vs. Tmax.
After observing Figures 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6, we would like to make some comments.
In Figure 4.4a, we see that at low values of Tmax the system admits more of customer
2’s traffic. This is, because it has less variation in traffic. As the Tmax requirement is
relaxed (Tmax is increased) the system admits more of customer 1’s traffic, because
that gives better payoff for the TP and the ISPs. In Figure 4.5a, we notice that
all of the λ curves have decreased. This is due to the increase in the variation
of customer 1’s traffic. In Figure 4.6a, the situation becomes more dramatic and
almost none of customer 1’s traffic is admitted.
Moreover, we see from comparing Figures 4.4b, 4.5b, and 4.6b, that the profit
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(a) λTotal , λ1, and λ2 vs. Tmax
(b) TP , ISP1 , and ISP2 vs. Tmax
(c) Customers’ Costs vs. Tmax
Figure 4.4: Outcome of the two Customers and two ISPs Game vs. Tmax for
Exponential Packet Lengths for Customer 1 and Deterministic Packet Lengths for
Customer 2
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(a) λTotal , λ1, and λ2 vs. Tmax
(b) TP , ISP1 , and ISP2 vs. Tmax
(c) Customers’ Costs vs. Tmax
Figure 4.5: Outcome of the two Customers and two ISPs Game vs. Tmax for Larger
Variations than Exponential Packet Lengths for Customer 1 and Deterministic
Packet Lengths for Customer 2
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(a) λTotal , λ1, and λ2 vs. Tmax
(b) TP , ISP1 , and ISP2 vs. Tmax
(c) Customers’ Costs vs. Tmax
Figure 4.6: Outcome of the two Customers and two ISPs Game vs. Tmax for Much
Larger Variations than Exponential Packet Lengths for Customer 1 and Determin-
istic Packet Lengths for Customer 2
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of the TP and the ISPs are degraded when the variation of customer 1’s traffic
increases. Finally, from observing Figures 4.4c, 4.5c, and 4.6c, we see how the
customers only pay for the amount and quality of service they get. Hence they are
treated fairly.
4.3 SCENARIO 2: TWO CUSTOMERS AND
THREE ISPs
Now we assume the case of having the TP choose three ISPs along the path from
source to destination. Again we assume two customers require their packets to
be delivered along this path. Once more we study two cases, one is the General
Case of arbitrarily choosing the traffic variation for each customer along with their
maximum allowable delay Tmax. The second case is the Fixed Tmax, in which
Tmax1 = Tmax2 = Tmax and we simulate for different values of Tmax.
4.3.1 General Case
Here we assume that customer 1’s traffic is of exponential packet lengths, whereas
customer 2’s traffic is of deterministic packet lengths. The initialization values
for the different variables in our model are shown in Table 4.3. Once again, we
would like to note that some of those values were taken from [14]. Moreover, the
simulation results, which represent the Nash equilibrium of the game are given in
Table 4.4.
We then include a number of plots representing the outcome of the game. These
plots can be found in Figures 4.7, 4.9, and 4.8.
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E1[T ]Nash 1.2463 [msec]
E2[T ]Nash 0.8737 [msec]
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(a) ∆µ1 vs. λ1 and λ2
(b) ∆µ2 vs. λ1 and λ2
(c) ∆µ3 vs. λ1 and λ2
Figure 4.7: Additional Bandwidth Acquired by ISP1 , ISP2 , and ISP3 as the Out-
come of the two Customers and three ISPs Game.
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(a) ISP1 vs. λ1 and λ2
(b) ISP2 vs. λ1 and λ2
(c) ISP3 vs. λ1 and λ2
Figure 4.8: The Utility of ISP1 , ISP2 , and ISP3 as the Outcome of the two Cus-
tomers and three ISPs Game.
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Figure 4.9: The Utility of the TP as the Outcome of the two Customers and three
ISPs Game.
4.3.2 Fixed Tmax Case
For this section we have Tmax1 = Tmax2 = Tmax and we study the effect of traffic
variation on the model alone. We will only consider two cases, one with customer 1
having exponential packet lengths, whereas customer 2 has deterministic packet
lengths. The other is when customer 1 has higher than exponential packet lengths,
whereas customer 2 has deterministic packet lengths. The initial conditions for the
simulation are given by Table 4.3. We then plot Figures 4.10, and 4.11. We can see
in both Figures 4.10a and 4.11a that no traffic from either customer is admitted
into the system if Tmax is below 2 msec. This is, because in this case the ISPs can
not provide this required QoS to the customers hence their profit would be negative
i.e. it turns into loss. Once again we find that the differences between Figures 4.10,
and 4.11 are only due to the traffic variation in customer 1’s traffic. We observe
how the utility functions degrade in the case of higher traffic variation in customer
1’s traffic, which is shown in Figures 4.10b and 4.11b.
To conclude this section, we would like to note the similarities in the behavior
of the model for the two scenarios presented so far. Namely, the scenario of having
two customers and two ISPs and having two customers and three ISPs. The trend
is the same which gives us a sense of comfort that the model can be expanded to
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(a) λTotal , λ1, and λ2 vs. Tmax
(b) TP , ISP1 , ISP2 , and ISP3 vs. Tmax
(c) Customers’ Costs vs. Tmax
Figure 4.10: Outcome of the two Customers and three ISPs Game vs. Tmax for
Exponential Packet Lengths for Customer 1 and Deterministic Packet Lengths for
Customer 2
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(a) λTotal , λ1, and λ2 vs. Tmax
(b) TP , ISP1 , ISP2 , and ISP3 vs. Tmax
(c) Customers’ Costs vs. Tmax
Figure 4.11: Outcome of the two Customers and three ISPs Game vs. Tmax for
Larger Variations than Exponential Packet Lengths for Customer 1 and Determin-
istic Packet Lengths for Customer 2
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any number of ISPs. In the final two sections of this chapter we continue to expand
our basic model to include the scenarios of having three customers and two ISPs
and finally three customers and three ISPs.
4.4 SCENARIO 3: THREE CUSTOMERS AND
TWO ISPs
In this scenario, the TP chooses two ISPs along the path from the source to the
destination. These two ISPs are serving three customers. Again we have two cases,
the General Case and the Fixed Tmax Case. Since we have three customers, hence
it is not possible to give plots for the General Case. However, we include plots for
the Fixed Tmax Case.
4.4.1 General Case
Customer 1’s traffic is of exponential packet lengths, whereas customer 3’s traffic
is of deterministic packet lengths. As for customer 2’s traffic, its variation is in
between that of customers 1 and 2. The initialization values for the different vari-
ables in our model are shown in Table 4.5. Some of those values were taken from
[14]. Moreover, the simulation results, which represent the Nash equilibrium of the
game are given in Table 4.6.
From these results we observe that customer 1 pays the most, because the system
admits the most traffic for it. Moreover, it has the most variation in traffic and
requires better QoS. We also see how ISP2 makes more profit than ISP1 , because
it promises more overall bandwidth and the overall time spent in its network is less
than that of ISP1 .
4.4.2 Fixed Tmax Case
In this section Tmax1 = Tmax2 = Tmax3 = Tmax and we study the effect of traffic
variation on the model alone. Two cases are considered, one with customer 1
having exponential packet lengths, customer 3 has deterministic packet lengths,
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and customer 2 having packet lengths of variation between the other two. The
other case is when customer 1 has higher than exponential packet lengths, whereas
customers 2 and 3 have the same packet length distributions as before. The initial
conditions for the simulation are given by Table 4.5. We then plot Figures 4.12,
and 4.13.
In Figure 4.12a, the curves for λ1, λ2, and λ3 are very close, because the varia-
tions of traffic between the customers is not that great. However, in Figure 4.13a,
we see a larger difference in the curves of λ1, λ2, and λ3. Specifically, it is observed
that customer 1’s traffic gets the least rate of admittance into the system, because it
has the largest variation in packet lengths. Furthermore, we observe a degradation
of profit of ISPs and the TP between Figures 4.12b and 4.13b. It is also noted that
in Figures 4.12c and 4.13c the cost paid by each customer depends on the rate of
variation of its traffic, the amount of its traffic admitted to the system, and the
QoS desired.
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(a) λTotal , λ1, λ2, and λ3 vs. Tmax
(b) TP , ISP1 , and ISP2 vs. Tmax
(c) Customers’ Costs vs. Tmax
Figure 4.12: Outcome of the three Customers and two ISPs Game vs. Tmax for
Exponential Packet Lengths for Customer 1, Deterministic Packet Lengths for Cus-
tomer 3, and in between for Customer 2
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(a) λTotal , λ1, λ2, and λ3 vs. Tmax
(b) TP , ISP1 , and ISP2 vs. Tmax
(c) Customers’ Costs vs. Tmax
Figure 4.13: Outcome of the three Customers and two ISPs Game vs. Tmax for
Larger Variations than Exponential Packet Lengths for Customer 1, Deterministic
Packet Lengths for Customer 3, and in between for Customer 2
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4.5 SCENARIO 4: THREE CUSTOMERS AND
THREE ISPs
We have reached the final scenario in which three ISPs serve three customers. We
will also display the General Case and the Fixed Tmax Case. No figures are shown
for the General Case, because four dimensions are needed to draw. We give only
the results. However, for the Fixed Tmax Case, plots are presented.
4.5.1 General Case
We combine the assumptions made over the previous two scenarios here. Customer
1’s traffic is of exponential packet lengths, whereas customer 3’s traffic is of de-
terministic packet lengths. As for customer 2’s traffic, its variation is in between
that of customers 1 and 2. The initialization values for the different variables in
our model are shown in Table 4.7. Some of those values were taken from [14]. The
simulation results, which represent the Nash equilibrium of the game are given in
Table 4.8.
Once again the results are consistent with the results of the other three scenarios.
ISP3 ’s profit is the highest due to its highest contribution. Customer 1 pays the
most monetary amount due to its high admittance rate, high variation in traffic,
and high QoS demand.
4.5.2 Fixed Tmax Case
In this case Tmax1 = Tmax2 = Tmax3 = Tmax and we only study the effect of traffic
variation. There is a slight difference from scenario 3 in regards to the packet
lengths. Two cases are considered, one with customer 1 having exponential packet
lengths, customer 3 has deterministic packet lengths, and customer 2 having packet
lengths of variation between the other two. The other case is when customer 1 has
higher than exponential packet lengths, whereas customer 2 has exponential packet
lengths, and customer 3 has deterministic packet lengths. The initial conditions for
the simulation are given in Table 4.7. We then plot figures 4.14, and 4.15.
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(a) λTotal , λ1, λ2, and λ3 vs. Tmax
(b) TP , ISP1 , ISP2 , and ISP3 vs. Tmax
(c) Customers’ Costs vs. Tmax
Figure 4.14: Outcome of the three Customers and three ISPs Game vs. Tmax
for Exponential Packet Lengths for Customer 1, Deterministic Packet Lengths for
Customer 3, and Packet Length Distribution in between the two for Customer 2
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(a) λTotal , λ1, λ2, and λ3 vs. Tmax
(b) TP , ISP1 , ISP2 , and ISP3 vs. Tmax
(c) Customers’ Costs vs. Tmax
Figure 4.15: Outcome of the three Customers and three ISPs Game vs. Tmax for
Larger Variations than Exponential Packet Lengths for Customer 1, Exponential
Packet Lengths for Customer 2, and Deterministic Packet Lengths for Customer 3
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The results seen from the figures are self-explanatory. They are consistent with
the previous scenarios. The conclusion we really want to make is that our model
can be expanded to more customers and supported by more ISPs.
4.6 A NAIVE CASE
After demonstrating how our pricing model works for four different scenarios and
how it can be extended to a larger number of customers and ISPs, a simple question
may arise. Can we think of an easy näıve way of achieving the same results? Is
there a simpler way of doing things in order to compare it with our more complex
algorithm that uses game theory for optimization?
We will try to answer this question in this section by taking the first scenario
of having two customers and two ISPs. Customer 1’s traffic has higher coefficient
of variation than that of exponential packet lengths, whereas customer 2 has deter-
ministic packet lengths.
A näıve way would be to consider the TP to be non-sophisticated. The problem
is that we do not know the actual rate of arrival of the customers’ traffic, λ1 and
λ2, which is needed to optimize the utility functions. Hence, the TP chooses λ1 and
λ2 according to some pre-defined ratios. So we consider ratios of λ1 and λ2 such
that λTotal = λ1 + λ2, where λTotal 6 λmaxTotal =
∑m
j=1 λmaxj . We have m = 2 for










where c1 and c2 are the coefficients of variation of customer 1 and customer 2’s
traffic.
We first need to calculate the value of λTotal . To do so, we assume that our
system contains only one customer. Hence we apply our model for one customer
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and two ISPs. From that, we find the λ that is optimal, which we will take to
be our λTotal . In Figure 4.16, we see that λ = 0.5011 packets/ms is the value that
maximizes the profit of both ISPs in a fair manner, which is taken to be the average
of the two λ’s maximizing each ISP’s profit alone.
Figure 4.16: Finding Optimal λ to Maximize Utilities of ISPs, assuming one cus-
tomer and two ISPs.
Then we run the näıve scenario in which λTotal is split into λ1 and λ2 according
to equations (4.1) and (4.2). The results are found in Table 4.9. Ratio, Ratio1 , and
















where E1 is the total average delay for customer 1 alone throughout the whole








where E2 is the total average delay for customer 2 alone throughout the whole
system end to end.
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Table 4.9: Comparison between our Model and the Naive Case.
λTotal λ1 λ2 ISP1 ISP2 PC1 PC2 Ratio Ratio1 Ratio2
Our Model 0.830 0.450 0.380 0.046 0.061 0.110 0.057 0.224 0.161 0.164
Näıve Case 0.501 0.137 0.364 0.046 0.051 0.051 0.056 0.168 0.060 0.148
The problem here is that this näıve scenario always gives less λ to the customer
of higher coefficient of variation of traffic, because of the ratios assigned. This
does not necessarily give the optimal payoffs for the ISPs. Furthermore, it provides
poorer service to the customers. As shown by Table 4.9, the values of Ratio, Ratio1 ,
and Ratio2 are strictly higher for our model. These variables are just the utilization
factor divided by the average delay. High values for these variables are indicators
of better service for the customers. Moreover, in the näıve case, we still needed to
use our model for the first step, which is to obtain the value for λTotal which is then
split into λ1 and λ2.
Therefore, there is no easy fix to this problem, and we need to apply game theory
to optimize our outcome. So, not only do we need the TP, because it knows the
Internet structure and routing topology, but it is also needed to choose a suitable
λTotal to maximize the profits of the ISPs and get some profit for itself.
4.7 FINAL REMARKS
In this section we make a comparison between the results of our model and that of
Malhamé et al in [14]. The comparison takes place for a two customers and a two
ISPs scenario. Customer 1’s traffic has higher coefficient of variation than that of
exponential packet lengths, whereas customer 2 has deterministic packet lengths.
Moreover, we have Tmax1 = Tmax2 = Tmax and we plot the outcome against Tmax.
We emphasize the necessity of taking the variation in traffic into account when
placing a model for pricing in a multiple ISP domain.
As seen in Figure 4.17, if we take the M/M/1 model as in [14], it gives us a false
indication that things look better. When adopting an M/G/1 model, we see how
the variation in traffic affects the rate of traffic admitted and it provides fairness
to customers of less variation in traffic. Moreover, from Figure 4.18, we also see
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(a) λTotal , λ1, and λ2 vs. Tmax for Malhamé’s Model (b) λTotal , λ1, and λ2 vs. Tmax for Our Model
Figure 4.17: Comparing λ’s for Our Model and Malhamé’s
(a) TP , ISP1 , and ISP2 vs. Tmax for Malhamé’s Model (b) TP , ISP1 , and ISP2 vs. Tmax for Our Model
Figure 4.18: Comparing Utility functions of the TP and the ISPs for Our Model
and Malhamé’s
CHAPTER 4. NUMERICAL RESULTS 63
(a) Customers’ Costs vs. Tmax for Malhamé’s Model (b) Customers’ Costs vs. Tmax for Our Model
Figure 4.19: Comparing Customers’ Costs for Our Model and Malhamé’s
how the M/M/1 model gives a false indication of higher profits, whereas our model
gives a more realistic measure of profit. It is also shown in Figure 4.19 that our
model gives fairness to customers. The customer with more variations in its traffic
needs to pay more than the one with less variations.
We also show that our model provides better service for customers. In Figure
4.20, we have a chart which shows that the delays from our model are less than
that of Malhamé’s case. We note that although customers pay more, because of
their variable delays, however, they get better service in terms of their overall delay
if they adopt our model. So not only does our model provide more accurate payoffs
for the ISPs, it also provides the customers with enhanced service as a return for
their higher costs, while adding fairness between customers. Moreover, we would
like to note that Figure 4.20 shows strictly less delay times for customer 2’s traffic
in contrast to customer 1’s traffic. The reason behind this, is that customer’s max-
imum tolerable delay (Tmax1) is initiated to be 3 msec, whereas that of customer 2,
is initiated to be 4 msec.
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Figure 4.20: Comparison between Our Model and Malhamé’s Model in terms of




In this thesis, we have studied many issues. We took a look at the structure of the
current Internet. We saw how it has a hierarchical form. Moreover, we discussed
how peering is becoming popular and the advantages and disadvantages of peering.
We also looked at the future of the Internet structure and how it tends to flatten
as the traffic volume increases gradually over the years.
Furthermore, we discussed the factors of a good pricing scheme which are:
• A customer’s preferences
• Efficiency of the network
• The way an ISP monitors a customer’s usage
We saw how balancing these factors would result in a good pricing scheme.
A number of pricing schemes were presented. They were studied to see how well
they comply with the three above mentioned factors. We saw how the cumulus
pricing scheme was a good candidate, but needed to be applied in a multiple ISP
environment.
Pricing in a multiple ISP domain was then discussed. We took a brief look at
some papers written in this field. Most of these papers used Game Theory to solve
this issue. Different models were presented along with the players of each game.
We then showed why we chose the model implemented by [14] as a base for our
work. This was, because it fulfills the three main factors for a good pricing scheme
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along with having a simple structure that can be implemented in a multiple ISP
domain. Some extensions to [14] were made to include more than one customer to
the game. These customers have various traffic classes with varying packet lengths.
As a result of varying packet lengths, each ISP is now represented by an M/G/1
queue instead of an M/M/1 queue.
Our model was then described in detail. We presented all the assumptions made,
the game framework, and formulation. Then numerical results were given for four
different scenarios of the game. Finally, we showed the effectiveness of adopting our
model as opposed to the model by [14] through a comparison. This result really
shows that traffic variation is an important factor to take into consideration when
placing a pricing scheme. We also thought of an easy way to solve this problem by
developing a näıve scheme. However, it turned out to be inadequate to solve our
problem.
We conclude this thesis by noting that the TP could be assigned to choose ISPs
along multiple paths, which is considered an open problem. Furthermore, we would
like to mention that further research of pricing is needed in areas such as mobile
networks, multi-hop radio networks, and ad-hoc wide-area 802.11b networks, which





Pseudocode for Two ISPs serving
Two Customers
In this section, we present a pseudocode of the program developed in MATLAB
for our pricing model. The scenario of two customers and two ISPs is shown here,




λ1 = λ2 ∈ [0, 0.5] (100 points)
λmax = 1
∆µ1 = ∆µ2 ∈ [0, 1] (100 points)
∆µmax1 = ∆µmax2 = 1
Tmax1 = 3
Tmax2 = 4
L1 = 2 (This is for exponential packet lengths)
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Procedure Begins
For u = 1 to length(λ2)









λ = λ1i + λ2u
For j = 1 to length(∆µ1)











































E = E1 + E2
Tmax = min(Tmax1 , Tmax2)

















ISP1 = (1−M) aPC S1 − p1 ∆µ1
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ISP2 = (1−M) aPC S2 − p2 ∆µ2
end for
end for
Calculate ∆µ∗1 and ∆µ
∗












2(µ2 + ∆µ∗2 − λ)(µ2 + ∆µ∗2)
E∗ = E∗1 + E
∗
2





TPi = M aPC
end for
end for
Find λ∗1 and λ
∗
2 that maximize TP
Hence λ∗ = λ∗1 + λ
∗
2
Find ∆µ∗∗1 and ∆µ
∗∗




2 (These are the NASH equilibrium values)
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Appendix B
Brief Explanation of Nash
Equilibrium used in our Program
This section presents the method implemented in our program to solve for the
Nash equilibrium in pure strategies in the game played between the ISPs (group of
followers). It is based on the cell-by-cell inspection method for simultaneous games,
which is shown in [4]. We only discuss the method for a game of two players, yet
it is very easy to extend it to a game of n players.
The best way to demonstrate this method is by using an example. In Fig-
ure B.1a, we give a numerical example for two players with three strategies in a
simultaneous game. In each cell, first the payoff of player 1 is displayed then fol-
lowed by the payoff of player 2. The three strategies for player 1 are Up, Middle,
and Down, whereas those of player 2 are High, Medium, and Low.
The cell-by-cell inspection method works as follows. First, we assume that
player 1 chooses the strategy Up. In this case player 2 is rational and chooses the
strategy that will maximize its payoff. This strategy is Medium, because it gives
it a payoff of 70. Hence player 2 eliminates its High and Low strategies for the
case of player 1 playing Up. The method continues in the same manner for the
strategies Middle and Down of player 1. By now player 2 would have eliminated
all the choices it would not pick. Figure B.1b reflects our discussion so far.
Now, the exact opposite is done. Player 2 keeps its strategies constant while
player 1 eliminates its choices. After doing this exercise we reach the state shown in
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Figure B.1c. The Nash equilibrium is found to be the cell which has no eliminations.
In our example it is the shaded one corresponding to the Middle and Medium
strategies of player 1 and player 2 respectively.
We used the concept of this method of cell-by-cell inspection and applied it
to our program with some minor necessary modifications to be adequate to the
MATLAB environment.
(a) An example of simultaneous game
with two players and three strategies.
(b) Hold player 1’s strategies constant
while eliminating player 2’s strategies.
(c) Hold player 2’s strategies constant
while eliminating player 1’s strategies.
Figure B.1: Example to illustrate how to solve for Nash equilibrium using cell-by-
cell inspection.
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